Se argumenta que la crítica de Pryor al escepticismo sobre la justificación perceptiva está fuera de foco: mientras que el dogmatismo puede ser una explicación exitosa sobre la justificación perceptiva de las creencias empíricas de primer orden (i.e. de la justificación proposicional), es estéril frente a las críticas escépticas (de segundo orden) sobre el estatus epistémico de las creencias justificadas perceptivamente (es decir, frente a críticas que señalan la ausencia de justificación doxástica). Argumentamos que las dos principales motivaciones que Pryor (...) ofrece a favor de su dogmatismo –evitar el escepticismo respecto de la justificación perceptiva y proporcionar una explicación intuitiva de la misma– fallan, debido, principalmente, a su compromiso con ciertas tesis de corte externista que imposibilitan la satisfacción de los requisitos metaepistémicos impuestos por el escéptico. En vista de este déficit explicativo respecto a sus propias motivaciones, concluimos que el dogmatismo no es una explicación adecuada de la justificación perceptiva en general. (shrink)

It is argued that the rule-circular justification of induction proposed by David Papineau is illegitimate, that is, that it is not a genuine justification.

It is argued that epistemological naturalism is the result of a holistic thesis plus a high valuation of empirical science. Epistemological naturalism criticizes the sceptic for entertaining unjustified global doubts and naturalism tries to avoid scepticism by taking for granted as non-problema..

Critical and pancritical rationalism were mainly debated in the second half of the XXth century, however a new important paper on pancritical rationalism has been published recently, and hence a critical commentary of this recent publication is required, one is offered here.

I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will (...) allow the characterization of ideal goals as rational. (shrink)

I criticize Laudan's constraints on cognitive aims as presented in Science and Values. These constraints are axiological consistency and non-utopianism. I argue that Laudan's prescription for non utopian aims is too restrictive because it excludes ideals and characterizes as irrational or non-rational numerous human contingencies. We aim to ideals because there is no cogent way to specify in advance what degree of deviation from an ideal is acceptable. Thus, one cannot dispense with ideals. Laudan does not distinguish difficult from impossible (...) goals, making his injunction against utopianism imprecise. It is "semantically utopian" and, furthermore, a prescription for conservatism and mediocrity. Goals often contradict each other or are at least partially incompatible. Since Laudan does not say how to prioritize incompatible aims, axiological consistency is an utopian desideratum. Thus, his constraints on cognitive aims contradict one another. Finally,, Laudan's axiological constraints are too weak and in order to strengthen them, he must invoke without justification some implicit pre-philosophical cognitive aims. This opens the logical possibility of axiological relativism, which Laudan attempted from the beginning to avoid. (shrink)

La importancia de los valores epistémicos en la adopción ya sea de la postura realista o de la anti-realista (o empirista) en el ámbito de la filosofía de la ciencia se ilustra con tres debates. Los debates en cuestión son: i) aquel sobre si debemos buscar explicar o no la extraordinariamente baja entropía del universo temprano, ii) el debate sobre si las regularidades nómicas empíricas requieren o no de explicación vía leyes de la naturaleza y iii) el debate entre Clarke (...) y Leibniz sobre la naturaleza del espacio físico. En estos debates los realistas en general priorizan la búsqueda de explicaciones causales y por ende buscan minimizar el número de hechos brutos, mientras que los anti realistas priorizan minimizar el número de entidades científicas inobservables; en tanto que este desacuerdo parece ser irresoluble sin recurrir a la petición de principio, o a la estipulación en favor de una o la otra de estas metas, entonces isostenia, es decir los argumentos en favor de ambas posturas parecen estar equilibrados, parecen ser igualmente convincentes y de esto se sigue la consecuente suspensión del juicio sobre cuál de estas posturas es la objetivamente correcta, así como un voluntarismo epistémico con relación a cuál de estas posturas adoptar. (shrink)

Se discute el análisis de M. Williams de la Concepción de la Fundamentación Previa de la justificación epistémica –una concepción supuestamente detrás del trilema de Agripa– y se le contrasta con la Concepción del Desafío por Defecto – la concepción alternativa de la justificación epistémica propugnada por Williams. Se argumenta que los privilegios epistémicos predeterminados de la CDD son un eufemismo para estipulaciones epistémicamente arbitrarias, asimismo se argumenta que mientras el CFP puede conducir a paradojas escépticas, la CDD conduce a (...) un pancriticismo paradójico y que cuál de estas dos paradojas preferir es un asunto de gusto o temperamento. Finalmente se arguye que la CDD no es ni una adecuada descripción de nuestra práctica filosófica, ni tampoco de nuestra práctica epistémica cotidiana. Se concluye entonces que la CFP es la concepción superior, aun si pudiese conducir al escepticismo pirrónico. Concluimos argumentando abiertamente en favor de un tipo de dogmatismo no epistémico con implicaciones pirrónicas para las presuposiciones absolutas de la ciencia Estas consecuencias, sin embargo, no tienen por qué ser incompatibles con la investigación científica. (shrink)

W. W. Bartley argued that Popper's original theory of rationality opened itself to a tu quoque argument from the irrationalist and to avoid this Bartley proposed an alternative theory of rationality: pancritical rationalism . Bartley's characterization of PCR leads, however, to self-referential paradox. David Miller outlaws self-reference by distinguishing between positions and statements, Miller's distinction looks, however, suspiciously like an ad hoc manoeuvre or as a stipulation that has to be accepted dogmatically. Furthermore, Miller's move is inadequate because it is (...) a second world answer to a third world problem, that is, to logical paradox. It is then argued that given the paradoxical nature of PCR, Popper's old justificationist critical rationalism with its minimum of dogmatism and irrationalism is malgré tout a better option. (shrink)

I argue contra Larry Laudan and Robert Nozick that valuable goals that are impossible (i.e., ideal goals) can be rational, if they are approachable without a known limit. It is argued that Laudan proscribes as irrational impossible goals because he holds a confused scheme for means/ends rationality. Moreover it is argued that it is counterintuitive to hold ideal goals to be irrational. On the other hand I argue that Nozick's generalization of utility theory so as to admit symbolic utilities will (...) allow the characterization of ideal goals as rational. (shrink)

It is argued that epistemological naturalism is the result of a holist thesis plus a high valuation of empirical science. Epistemological naturalism criticizes the sceptic for entertaining unjustified global doubts and naturalism tries to avoid scepticism by taking for granted as non problematic our background scientific knowledge and by recommending only a localist or piecemealist mending of our corpus of knowledge, these corrections will be motivated by limited and justified questions. It is argued that the epistemological naturalist: i) Cannot justify (...) without vicious circularity the most basic methods of science nor epistemological naturalism's localist recommendation. ii) That if epistemological naturalism intends to be a description of genuine scientific methods then naturalism tacitly takes for granted, i.e., without justification, some epistemic norms. iii) That natural science itself produces traditional sceptic doubts, and therefore epistemological naturalism cannot avoid scepticism. iv) That naturalism can neither avoid sceptic doubts by substituting an argumentative theory of justification with a reliabilist theory. (shrink)

Laudan's proposed constraints on cognitive aims are criticized. It is argued that: Laudan does not distinguish impossible goals from impossible but approachable goals; and owing to that imprecision Laudan recommends conservatism and mediocrity. Impossible but approachable goals can be rational objectives, if we understand means/ends rationality as the attitude of someone who tries to reach the warranted optimum means to the attainment of or approximation to his desired aims. Ideals cannot be dispensed with, because in advance there is no satisfactory (...) way of specifying how close to the ideal, or how far from it, is good enough. Laudan's recommendation is too restrictive and counter-intuitive because it characterizes idealist conduct as irrational. A life's struggle for a utopian and a very valuable aim can cause lasting emotions of self-respect or self-esteem -- at least for certain temperaments, and in some social settings -- and those emotions are necessary for a good life; therefore, the search for impossible but approachable valuable goals, and their accompanying positive emotions, may be a rational goal. Laudan's banning of `semantically utopian' and `epistemically utopian' aims is also too restrictive, because we often pursue an end that is obscure for the conscious mind; in such cases, we still try to approach the obscure aim, by the via negativa, that is, by eliminating what it is not. Laudan needs to invoke some `pre-philosophical' cognitive canons of scientific success, and those `pre-philosophical' canons cannot be justified empirically as valuable without invoking some intuitions about genuine examples of successful science -- even though Laudan has told us that his meta-methodology does not require intuitions. Furthermore Laudan does not justify his priorization of his pragmatic canons of scientific success; Laudan's priorization has a dogmatic character. (shrink)

La búsqueda de la justificación de los métodos, o criterios de la ciencia, no es unmero ejercicio académico. El artículo analiza la influyente respuesta a este problemaque ha proporcionado la epistemología evolutiva, constituida por dos familias diferentes Una busca analogías entre la evolución de l..

The normative naturalism proposed by Larry Laudan cannot avoid some unjustified a priori or intuitive premises, a situation that contradicts his explicit purpose of proposing a metamethodology without these kinds of assumptions. The naturalized scientific methodology only wants to be as empirica..

Se argumenta que una justificación evolucionista de nuestros presupuestos metodológicos más básicos, es viciosamente circular y que incluso hay razones para dudar de la racionalidad de una explicación evolucionista de nuestros presupuestos metodológicos.

It is argued that Pryor's criticism of scepticism of perceptual justification misses the point: while Pryor's dogmatism can provide a successful explication of the perceptual justification of first order empirical beliefs ( i.e. , an explication of propositional justification), it is barren vis à vis second order sceptical criticisms about the epistemic status of beliefs justified via perception (that is, criticisms pointing to the lack of doxastic justification). We argue that the two main motivations that Pryor offers for his dogmatism (...) – to avoid scepticism of perceptual justification and to explicate perceptual justification – fail due to his commitment with some externalist theses, which make it impossible to satisfy the metaepistemic requisites imposed by the sceptic. Hence given the lack of satisfaction of Pryor's own goals, we conclude that Pryor's dogmatism is not an adequate explication of perceptual justification. (shrink)

Citation-based metrics are increasingly used as a proxy to define representative, considerable, or significant papers. We challenge this belief by taking into account factors that may play a role in providing citations to a manuscript and whether/how those highly cited studies could shape a scientific field. A different approach to summarisation of relevant core publications within a topic is proposed.

This article aims to highlight the theoretical and philosophical debate on hospitality underlining the normative elements of framing migrants and refugees as individual agents in the light of hospitality theory and migration governance. It argued the critiques of the neo-Kantian hospitality approach and the EU welcome culture with regard to refugees in the EU from a philosophical perspective. The “No human being is illegal” motto is proposed to be conceived as a principle of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The (...) cosmopolitan right to visit and the universal right to reside were discussed in the context of human rights and co-responsibility. Linking the hospitality approach with migration governance enables the reconstruction of reception policies and practices, diversification of non-state actors that engage in migration governance mechanism, and polarization of political initiatives (e.g., politics of allocation and dispersal, readmission negotiations, convergence/divergence of priorities and strategic interests). The research findings highlight that the EU adopted a neo-Kantian hospitality approach that combines both “co-responsibility” and “vertical/heterarchical relations.” The EU’s “New Pact on Migration and Asylum” was considered proof of how the EU follows neo-Kantian hospitality that is manifested in dualism and contradictory approach. The study presents a typology that splits co-responsibility into individual/institutional actions and human rights/migration governance. (shrink)

Most model checking techniques for security protocols make a number of simplifying assumptions on the protocol and/or on its execution environment that greatly complicate or even prevent their applicability in some important cases. For instance, most techniques assume that communication between honest principals is controlled by a Dolev-Yao intruder, i.e. a malicious agent capable to overhear, divert, and fake messages. Yet we might be interested in establishing the security of a protocol that relies on a less unsecure channel (e.g. a (...) confidential channel provided by some other protocol sitting lower in the protocol stack). In this paper we propose a general model for security protocols based on the set-rewriting formalism that, coupled with the use of LTL, allows for the specification of assumptions on principals and communication channels as well as of complex security properties that are normally not handled by state-of-the-art security protocol analysers. By using our approach we have been able to formalise all the assumptions required by the ASW protocol for optimistic fair exchange and some of its key security properties. Besides the previously reported attacks on the protocol, we report a new attack on a patched version of the protocol. (shrink)

We provide an account of necessary a posteriori identity statements that relies upon Perry’s multipropositionalism. On our account an utterance of, e.g., ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, semantically makes available several propositions, one of which is necessary (and a priori) and another of which is a posteriori (and contingent). Since our view resembles two-dimensionalism, one might assume that it is undermined by the sorts of nesting arguments that Soames and others have raised against two-dimensionalism. We demonstrate, however, that our account is immune (...) to such nesting arguments. (shrink)

pt. 1. G.W.F. Hegel -- 2. pt. Friedrich Nietzsche --.

Resumen En este artículo se examina el Darwinismo Neural en su explicación de la evolución de la conciencia humana, contrastando su metodología con la utilizada por Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins y Steven Rose, quienes han hecho importantes aportaciones en el estudio de los sistemas vivos desde un punto de vista dialéctico. Concluimos que la explicación interaccionista de la evolución de la conciencia planteada en el DN, supera muchas de las deficiencias del determinismo biológico; sin embargo, al compartir algunos lineamientos con (...) el cartesianismo, mantiene un carácter a-histórico insuficiente para la explicación de la conciencia humana. Finalmente, proponemos la adopción de una teoría explicativa de la conciencia humana que considere las relaciones existentes en ella, no sólo como interacciones sino también como interpenetraciones ontogénicas y filogenéticas.This article examines Neural Darwinism proposed as an explanation of evolution of human consciousness. His methodology is contrasted with that used by Richard Lewontin, Richard Levins, and Steven Rose, who made important contributions to the study of living systems from a dialectical point of view. We conclude that the interactionist explanation of the evolution of conscience put forward in ND overcomes many of the deficiencies proper to biological determinism. However, as ND also shares many of the foundations of the Cartesian approach, it maintains a non-historical character, insufficient for the account of human consciousness. We suggest the adoption of an alternative theory, able to fully explain human conscience which must consider the whole of existing relations in it, and, instead of merely considering them as interactions, they have to be observed as dialectical interpenetrations. (shrink)

Resumen Me propongo aclarar la noción de “fenómeno” de Jean-Luc Marion y su relación con la categoría de “fenómeno saturado”. Para ello discutiré las interpretaciones de algunos comentaristas que advierten tensiones entre la primera y la segunda tópica del fenómeno.I aim to clarify Jean-Luc Marion’s notion of “phenomenon” and its relationship with the category of “saturated phenomenon”. To this end I discuss the interpretations of some commentators who point out tensions between the first and the second topic of the phenomenon (...) presented. (shrink)

Ornelas, Jorge; Cíntora, Armando (eds.). Dudas filosóficas. Ensayos sobre escepticismo antiguo, moderno y contemporáneo. México, Barcelona: UAM-Gedisa, 2014. 424 pp.

This is a welcome reprint of a book that continues to grow in importance.